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Over the past decade, Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stock has grown markedly, rising almost 
65% at a global level. This led to an increasing awareness on behalf of policymakers as to its 
role as a source of economic growth. For example, in 2016, FDI accounted for 35% of global 
GDP (Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Neto & Veiga, 2013). The Euro Area (EA) has been 
both a key recipient of FDI investments and an important FDI supplier. This has been attributed 
not only to the elimination of transaction costs and exchange risk in the reallocation of capital 
between members of the monetary union (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Darvas et al., 2013), 
but also to an increase in international investors’ confidence in its financial institutions and 
supervisory bodies (Shatz & Venables, 2000). In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis 
(GFC), worries about fiscal sustainability in the EA intensified (Merler and Pisani-Ferry, 2012; 
Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth & Erdogan, 2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018) as risks 
in the banking sector fed back to the sovereign position and vice versa, generating a detrimental 
cycle (De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2014; Delatte et al., 2017). As a result, in the 
run-up of the sovereign debt crisis, the EA experienced significant capital outflows.  
In this context, our paper examines how sovereign and banking sector risks that 
accumulated during the crises affected FDI in the EA. More specifically, we dissect the effect 
of sovereign and banking risk in origin (foreign investors) and host countries (EA), which we 
consider as main drivers of investors’ capital allocation in the period of analysis. We draw from 
several strands of the literature on FDI in scenarios of crisis (e.g., Milesi-Ferretti & Tille, 2010; 
Weitzel et al., 2014; Darvas et al., 2013; Habib and Venditti, 2018; Acharya et al., 2007; Carril-
Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019), as well as work on investment 
allocation during the sovereign debt crisis (e.g., Beck et al., 2016; Weitzel et al., 2014). 
However, our approach extends the empirical literature on FDI that typically considers just 
domestic factors as drivers for foreign investment (e.g., Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Dellis 
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et al., 2016; Razin & Sadka, 2007). By contraposing banking and sovereign stress in the country 
where FDI originates (i.e., the origin country) with the corresponding recipient country of FDI 
(i.e., the host), our paper isolates the impact that EA countries’ sovereign and banking risk have 
on their ability to attract FDI from other factors, whilst also considering the relative importance 
of origin countries’ domestic risk. Moreover, we provide evidence on cross-country spillovers 
arising from sovereign and banking sectors’ stress and the transmission to the Euro Area 
through FDI. From a methodological perspective, we argue that the modelling of the EA 
constitutes per se an ideal setting for our empirical analysis, given all countries in the European 
Monetary Union (EMU) have a common currency and monetary policy, which mutes the effect 
from monetary transmission and allows for a cleaner identification of variations in the financial 
account of the Balance of Payments.  
The empirical analysis employs a large panel dataset from the IMF Coordinated Foreign 
Direct Investment Survey (IMF CDIS) on 112 countries FDI stock positions between 2009 and 
2016, which we adopt to identify inward FDI in the EA. The main advantage of this dataset is 
that disaggregating countries’ FDI positions using their immediate counterpart, the CDIS data 
allows for a cross-country and over time comparison of FDI positions (Damgaard & Elkjaer, 
2017). We subsequently match the obtained data on bilateral FDI positions with bank and 
sovereign risk measures for host and origin countries. Additionally, we control for all the 
standard gravity variables commonly used in extant literature on international FDI (e.g., Martin 
& Rey, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005; Daude & Fratzscher, 2008).  
Our empirical work yields three main findings. Firstly, we observe that an increase in 
non-performing loans-over-total loans – widely employed in the banking literature (see Aiyar 
& Monaghan, 2015) to test banking sector stability – in the origin country leads to a decrease 
in FDI. However, importantly, changes in the corresponding bank risk in host countries leaves 
inward-FDI unaffected. Secondly, we find that FDI responds negatively to upturns in sovereign 
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yields both in origin as well as host countries, arguing that (i) an increase in origin country 
sovereign yield encourages corporate sector Multinational Enterprises (MNEs) to engage in 
less risk-taking, whilst (ii) an increase in host country yield implies that other destinations 
appear more attractive. Additionally, when the EA sample is separated into subsamples of non-
stressed and stressed (GIIPS: Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries, these 
findings are confirmed, reinforcing our confidence regarding the identified transmission 
channels. In a nutshell, what we find is that economic conditions – including financial stability 
– in origin countries particularly matters for FDI. Here, the key point is the identification of a 
spillover effect of risk in origin countries to the Euro Area through FDI. Finally, we re-affirm 
findings in the literature related to the importance of economic and financial ties in investment 
and financing decisions, embedded in standard gravity variables.  
Overall, we identify four main strands of the FDI literature to which our work relates. 
Firstly, there is a wide range of literature affirming the importance of economic and financial 
ties in investment and financing decisions, embedded in standard gravity models. These results 
find a common root in both the literature on institutional affinity (see Shukla & Cantwell, 
2018), or on transaction costs, whereby ceteris paribus, countries’ geographical closeness or 
common cultural background considerably reduces informational and transaction costs, 
therefore affecting FDI decisions (Martin & Rey, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005; Daude & 
Fratzscher, 2008; Beck et al., 2016; Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008; Sondermann & 
Vansteenkiste, 2019). Other factors similarly popular in this literature consist of proxies for 
institutional quality (see Dellis et al., 2017), as well as identifiers of incentives for regulatory 
or tax evasion (see Damgaard et al., 2018; Haufler et al., 2018; Egger et al., 2018). In our paper, 
we include standard gravity variables adopted by the previous literature, as well as additional 
variables which are specific to the context of crisis under consideration.  Secondly, we draw 
from a limited number of studies that consider the response of FDI to macroeconomic shocks 
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arising during crises. These include studies on the Asian financial crisis (Aguiar and Gopinath, 
2005; Acharya et al., 2007), the Latin American financial crisis (Krugman, 2000), other 
emerging markets crises (Alquist et al., 2013), and the GFC and sovereign debt crisis 
(Demertzis & Pontuch, 2013; Forster et al., 2011; Darvas et al., 2013; Beck et al., 2016; 
Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019). Thirdly, we contribute to studies on the sovereign debt 
crisis and determinants of euro-area sovereign bond yield spreads (vs. German bunds), which 
are commonly viewed as key indicators of crisis intensity (Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; 
Bernoth & Erdogan, 2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018). Such studies investigate the role of 
banking risk in transforming the GFC into sovereign debt crisis, and consequently, the nexus 
between banking risk and sovereign risk (De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Acharya et al., 2018; 
Delatte et al., 2017). Finally, a set of studies on FDI considers the EMU membership and its 
impact on the ability of its composing countries to attract FDI (see Shatz & Venables, 2000; 
Carril-Caccia & Pavlova, 2018; Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019). 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: in Section 2 we further explore the 
theoretical and empirical background that motivates our study. In Section 3, we explain the 
proposed methodology. In Section 4, we provide an exhaustive description of our dataset and 
the underlying literature justifying our choices. The empirical results are presented in Section 
5. In Section 6, we present robustness tests and, in Section 7, the conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical and empirical background 
The recent crises experienced by countries in the Euro Area, as well as the GFC, provided non-
trivial evidence on the effect of bank credit cycles on economic growth, and fiscal and financial 
stability (Shin, 2012; Rey, 2013; Habib & Venditti, 2018). The build-up (and subsequent 
decline) of bank credit growth has been detrimental for domestic economies and a crucial 
predictor of crisis, and also largely synchronised on a global scale (Shin, 2012; Rey, 2013; 
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Banti & Phylaktis, 2019). Similarly, in the context of the sovereign debt crisis, sovereign yields 
increased in numerous countries and regions. Several authors found evidence of contagion 
arising from spillovers from stressed EA countries sovereign risk across the EA (see Claeys & 
Vašícek, 2014) and other advanced and emerging economies (Beirne & Fratzscher, 2013).  
In light of the above evidence, it becomes interesting to distinguish between origin and 
host countries’ financial conditions when analysing the determination of inward FDI in the 
Euro Area. To do so, our paper newly hypothesises that both host and origin countries’ 
conditions are relevant determinants of cross-country transmission of global FDI. In particular, 
we posit that greater risk in the origin country’s banking sector (observed using the outstanding 
amount of non-performing loans as a ratio of total bank loans) is expected to depress FDI in 
the EA. This can be interpreted as a ‘leverage channel’, whereby firms borrow from banks in 
their home country to finance investment, including FDI. This effect will be stronger for firms 
wishing to invest overseas where imperfect knowledge considerations are greater. According 
to this argument, credit availability1 is an important determinant of FDI. The importance of 
credit cycles for the real economy (Bernanke & Gertler, 1990; Bordo & Jeanne, 2002; Chen et 
al., 2012) has led to attempts by policymakers to tame them. Similarly, we assume that in origin 
countries, greater sovereign credit risk (observed by examining the yields of 10-year national 
government bonds) will encourages the corporate sector MNEs to engage in less risk-taking. 
This is due to a stronger motive for companies to hoard cash for precautionary motives (see 
Akguc & Choi, 2013). Different precautionary motives have been explored by the finance 
literature, such as higher uncertainty about future cash flows (Bacchetta et al., 2014) or the 
future macro-economic conditions (Gao & Grinstein, 2014). Analogously, recent work has 
 
1 Arguments related to the importance of credit availability for M&As, also called brownfield FDI, have been put 
forward by Harford (2005), amongst others. As described by Harford (2005), brownfield FDI could depend on 
industry, technological and regulatory shocks, which in the latter case included Basel regulation on banks’ capital 
requirements, but also on the availability of "capital liquidity to accommodate the asset reallocation" (Harford, 
2005, p. 530). 
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identified higher cash holdings and less investment generally due to financial crises (Campello 
et al., 2010; Pinkowitz et al., 2013; Song & Lee, 2012).  
As far as the host country is concerned, we assume that greater banking risk (i.e., greater 
banks’ non-performing loans) will also discourage foreign investment in the EA. In this respect, 
a comprehensive literature already exists on the impact of host countries economic 
fundamentals on inward FDI (Cai et al., 2018; Bevan and Estrin, 2004; Bellak et al., 2009; 
Dellis et al., 2017; for a review see Antonakakis and Tondl, 2011). Analogously, we 
hypothesise that periods of high sovereign yields will lead to lower inward FDI in the EA, via 
a credit risk channel. This is consistent with existing evidence, which uses sovereign credit 
ratings as a proxy for sovereign risk, and shows that rating changes affect investment (Chen et 
al., 2013) and direct investment (Cai et al., 2018). In other words, we expect that when credit 
risk is higher, this will make investment in the EA less attractive to foreign investors than 
investments in other, less risky foreign countries. Both our measures of banking and sovereign 
risk have been widely used by academics, practitioners and policy makers in their periodic 
assessment of a country credit risk (and financial stability) – especially during the years of the 
sovereign debt crisis and immediately afterwards. Therefore, these provide an ideal proxy for 
investors’ assessment (both of origin and host countries) of the outstanding financial stability 




To analyse the effects of risk and financial stability on FDI, we build a panel dataset including 
all available bilateral holdings of origin and host countries. Specifically, the dataset contains 
information on the end-of-the-year positions of 112 foreign direct investor countries in 16 EA 
countries2 over the period ranging from 2009 to 2016. We take the logarithm of our dependent 
 
2 As in Beck et al. (2016), we consider all Euro Area (EA) countries with the exception of small countries with 
large financial sectors (i.e., Malta and Luxembourg) and Lithuania, as it joined the EA in 2015. 
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variable3, as well as our proxy variables for sovereign and banking risk, and equations (3.1) 
and (3.2) below show our chosen regression specification: 
 
log(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖ℎ,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1 log(𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖ℎ + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝑖ℎ + 𝛽4 log(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠ℎ,𝑡) +
𝜀𝑖ℎ,𝑡                      (3.1)          
                 
log(𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖ℎ,𝑡) = 𝛼 + 𝛽0𝑡 + 𝛽1 log(𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡) + 𝛽2𝐺𝑖ℎ + 𝛽3𝑂𝐶𝑖ℎ + 𝛽4 log(𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑒𝑠ℎ,𝑡) +
𝜀𝑖ℎ,𝑡                   (3.2) 
 
In the regression equations, i is the country of the foreign direct investor (or origin country), 
while h denotes the host country. Our main variables of analysis are 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 =
{𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝐵𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ,𝑡} consisting of banking sector risk origin countries i and 
host countries h; and, 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑡 = {𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡, 𝑆𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑔𝑛 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘ℎ,𝑡} which 
represents sovereign yields of origin (i) and host countries (h). Gih includes our set of gravity 
variables, representing transaction (and information) costs and the cultural bonds connecting 
the host-origin country pairs. OCih stands for other control variables (see subsection 4.3 
Additional risk measure and main controls), accounting for other motives that could drive 
direct investment in the EA. Taxesh represents host EA countries tax revenues over GDP, and 
proxies host countries’ fiscal regimes. t is instead a time dummy included to account for time 
fixed-effects causing abnormal variations in FDI. Finally, εih,t represents the error term. We 
estimate (3.1) and (3.2) using a least squares approach with Huber-Eiker-White robust standard 




3 As Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), since several observations in the FDI dataset have value of zero. Before taking 
the log, we replaced those values of cross-country FDI with the value of 1 USD. This enable us to preserve the 
greatest possible amount of observations without affecting the reliability of our results.  
4 Test for the error component structure have been performed using Wooldridge test for serial correlation 




4.1. Dependent variable 
The dependent variable used in our paper is the bilateral FDI holdings of 112 direct investor 
countries in the Euro Area (EA). In a similar vein to Beck et al. (2016), we compose our dataset 
using end-of-the-year bilateral FDI in the Euro Area, collected from the IMF Coordinated 
Foreign Direct Investment Survey (CDIS) between 2009 and 2016. 
The CDIS is a dataset published by the IMF in 2010 and updated on an annual basis. It 
has been created to allow a global analysis of cross-country linkages. In the dataset, the IMF 
provides data on bilateral direct investment holdings of more than 100 countries, participating 
in the survey. Moreover, disaggregating countries’ FDI positions using their immediate 
counterpart, the CDIS data allows for a cross-country and over time comparison of FDI 
positions (Damgaard & Elkjaer 2017). Consequently, we are in a position to observe bilateral 
direct investment, disentangling effects and drivers of origin and host countries. This allows 
for a better identification of effects as compared to standard approaches used in the literature 
which implicitly assumes that host characteristics are the main drivers. 
To emphasise, the main advantage of this dataset is that it enables us to disentangle 
origin and destination of FDI. This is of course necessary in order to be able to test our 
hypothesis. Our hypothesis requires use information on the host and origin country 
simultaneously as determinants of the direct investment. As highlighted in Beck et al. (2016), 
the understanding of the causes and origins of these foreign investors’ positions is of crucial 
importance for policy makers. For instance, with respect to central bank policy, while intra 
Euro Area flows can be easily managed by the ECB, significant variations of outside (non-EA) 
FDI – particularly ‘sudden stops’ in FDI – could potentially undermine central banks’ goals 
and targets. As a matter of fact, as pointed out by the authors, intra-EA capital allocation can 
be more easily supervised and managed by the ECB through Target balances and variations in 
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official flows. In the following sections, we exploit the bilateral properties of our data to 
compare bilateral inward FDI in “stressed” and “non-stressed” Euro Area countries5 (cf. Table 
2) from all countries with inward FDI. 
Of course, there are some caveats to mention related to the use of this data which we 
try to minimise. Firstly, FDI data from the CDIS is unadjusted for valuation effects. Secondly, 
to increase the representativeness of the data, CDIS include data on both listed and unlisted 
firms, however, different valuation methods, especially for unlisted firms, can generate 
significant geographical asymmetries in the data (Damgaard & Elkjaer, 2017). Thirdly, data 
from the CDIS is not adjusted for exchange rate effects. Therefore, changes in stock positions 
could potentially reflect EUR/USD exchange rate movements. As Beck et al. (2016, p.452) 
notes, “purging these valuation effects from the stock positions would require detailed 
knowledge about the currency and maturity composition of the holdings, on which data do not 
exist.” Finally, as the dataset discloses FDI by immediate counterpart economy, it also includes 
transactions performed by MNEs through Special Purpose Entities (SPEs), often for tax 
avoidance purposes or financial engineering (Dellis et al. 2017; Damgaard & Elkjaer, 2017; 
Damgaard et al., 2018; Haufler et al., 2018; Egger et al., 2018). This effect might be greater in 
smaller countries that have relatively large financial sectors. 
Therefore, as remarked on by Beck et al. (2016) and Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2010), ideally 
we would use a panel dataset collecting consolidated bilateral flows, adjusted for exchange rate 
effects and recorded on a residence (locational) basis, where “the ‘ultimate risk’ basis implies 
that the borrower is the entity ultimately responsible for the liability” (Milesi-Ferretti et al., 
2010: 21), but such data does not exist. Thus, to minimise the aforementioned biases and avoid 
data distortions, following Beck et al. (2016) we exclude countries considered major tax 
 
5 Defined according to their exposure to the European sovereign debt crisis (see Table 7 – Summary Statistics, 
for reference). 
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heavens and smaller countries with proportionately large financial sectors and we use stock 
data.6 Finally, to mitigate the impact of the exchange rate channel, we build our baseline model 
‘in levels’ and test the robustness of our results to economic growth, using GDP per capita in 
USD. Note that Table 7 presents summary statistics for our dependent variable and risk 
measures for GIIPS and non-GIIPS Euro Area countries.  
For the sake of transparency and completeness, in Figure 1, we also present aggregated 
– non-bilateral – data on FDI flows collected from UNCTAD. Such flow data, unfortunately, 
does not suit our empirical study due to its opacity regarding the nationality of the foreign 
direct investor (origin country), limiting its use to a descriptive assessment of FDI behaviour 
during and after the crisis. Interestingly, looking at FDI inflows in the Euro Area, we observe 
a substantial drop during the GFC.  Subsequently, it appears to stabilise (see Figure 1) and 
stagnate until early 2015, when it surges. Recent work on FDI has also observed this pattern 
and argued that direct investment appears to differ in its drivers from all other forms of 
international investments and has proved considerably more resilient than portfolio flows to 
domestic countries during crises (Milesi-Ferretti & Tille, 2010; Forster et al., 2011; Darvas et 
al., 2013; Pegkas, 2015; Sondermann & Vansteenkiste, 2019). Several authors observed this 
intriguing response of FDI to the crisis. Habib and Venditti (2018) found that FDI is less 
sensitive to global risk and that it seems to “follow a cycle which is different from other asset 
classes” (Habib & Venditti, 2018:17). Sondermann and Vansteenkiste (2019) controlled for 
both the GFC and for the sovereign debt crisis found evidence of a low sensitivity of FDI in 
the EMU to their domestic crisis dummies.  Recent work from Milesi-Ferretti and Tille (2010), 
considering just the period of the GFC, yielded also similar results. This per se seems to provide 
some validation for our hypotheses on the importance of other factors of risk, other than the 
domestic ones.  
 
6 For a detailed overview see Appendix A.0.2. 
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4.2. Independent variables   
As said, we focus on specific risks for MNEs involved in FDI. Particularly, we look at financial 
stability, arising from concerns about a fragile banking sector and high sovereign indebtedness 
with implications for the overall economy and consequently on the expected investment return 
(Acharya et al., 2018). 
Specifically, as proxy for bank risk taking, we opt for using the ratio of banks non-
performing loans-over-total loans (NPL ratio), which measures the outstanding banks credit 
risk, by quantifying the vulnerable portion of banks’ assets. Hence, this constitutes a 
straightforward measure of banks’ risk. NPLs affect bank lending through at least three main 
channels: (i) eroding banks’ profitability, as NPLs generate less income for banks and require 
more provisions, reducing their net income; (ii) reducing banks available capital, since banks’ 
capital adequacy regulation require banks to allocate capital buffers proportionally to the risk 
of their assets; (iii) greater funding costs, arising from the worsening of banks credit profile, as 
a result of their impaired balance sheet (Aiyar & Monaghan, 2015). European Institutions 
significantly increased their focus on reducing the level of banks’ non-performing loans of EA 
banks after the GFC (see Deslandes et al., 2018, for a review of European institutions debate 
and initiatives on NPLs). Higher NPLs impact the private sector, particularly in countries 
relying heavily on bank financing such as within the Euro Area, making access to credit harder 
and more expensive, especially for SMEs (ibid.). Data on non-performing loans ratio is 
collected from the ‘Financial Institutions: Stability’ indicators of the World Bank Global 
Financial Development DataBank. 
To measure sovereign risk we use instead 10-year government bond yields. This is a 
widely agreed proxy for sovereign risk (Arghyrou & Kontonikas, 2012; Bernoth & Erdogan, 
2012; Afonso et al., 2014, 2018). Recent works, by e.g. Cai et al. (2018), have examined the 
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relation between sovereign credit ratings and FDI. While using credit ratings is a reasonable 
measure, we believe that using sovereign bond yields for our purposes is a superior approach, 
as it reflects the market perspective and should react more quickly to changes in relevant 
information – see Barroso (2010) and De Vries & de Haan (2016). To maximise our sample 
coverage, we merge data from IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS), OECD 
Financial Statistics, CEIC, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, and Bloomberg. 
Figure 2 shows the evolution of our sovereign and banking risk measures. We observe 
a decline outside the EA zone and for non-GIIPS countries, whilst for GIIPS countries, 
sovereign risk increased dramatically until mid-2012. At the peak of the sovereign debt crisis, 
sovereign yields in GIIPS countries being more than 3 times higher than non-GIIPS ones, and 
still twice higher at the end of 2016. After the extraordinary commitment from the ECB to 
stabilise the EMU, spreads began to fall. They remain, however, at elevated levels by the end 
of our sample period. Non-performing loans-over-total loans also show a similar pattern. 
Therefore, even if in 2016 non-performing loans of EA banks were still at a much higher than 
in 2009, we can observe that in 2013, just after the announcement of the Outright Monetary 
Transactions (OMT) program and the creation of the Banking Union, they either stabilised (in 
non-GIIPS countries) or substantially reduced (in GIIPS). Moreover, the substantial variation 
that we detect in both our measures of risk is certainly something that we can exploit in our 
analysis. 
As evident from Figure 2, however, neither financial stability risk nor the following 
recovery is homogeneous across the EA. In particular, sovereign yields and non-performing 
loans remain considerably higher in GIIPS countries than in non-GIIPS countries, leaving 
overall risk in the EA at high levels. In light of this, we question whether financial stability risk 
in EA might just be driven by risk in the former group, rather than in the latter, but then 
affecting the EA as a whole. To address this empirical question, in our empirical analysis, we 
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test the impact of financial stability risk on inward FDI considering both the EA as a whole and 
separating it between GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries (see Tables 1 and 2). 
Overall, the implication of these graphs are twofold: on the one hand, they highlights 
again the importance of the ‘regulator’ in improving sovereign and banks’ safeness – as the 
ECB Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT) and Quantitative Easing (QE) programs have 
reduced both EA countries average yields and banks’ exposure to NPLs; on the other hand, the 
graphs also supports the hypothesis of a strong fragmentation within the Euro Area, arising 
from significant differences in both measures of risk. 
 
4.3. Additional risk measure 
For robustness reasons, we re-estimate our models using a different bank risk measure. We 
select a popular measure that has been frequently used to measure the outstanding risk of banks: 
banks Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets. This, we think that certainly is a focused 
measure of the stability of each country’s banking system, particularly given its contemporary 
policy attention. Our idea is that if banks are asked to hold more regulatory capital, this will 
likely have a detrimental impact on the amount lent to firms (Fraisse et al. 2017; De Goede, 
2004; Flinders and Buller, 2006; Dovis et al., 2016). 
In more detail, Regulatory Capital to Risk-Weighted Assets measures the aggregate 
amount of core capital allocated by a country’s banking sector as a buffer on their risky assets. 
This variable is commonly used in the banking literature to assess the stability of the banking 
sector (see De Bruyckere et al. (2013), Afonso et al. (2018), Delatte et al. (2017) and reflects 
policymakers attempts to address excessive bank risk taking through greater capital buffers. In 
order to maximise the country sample, we combined data from the IMF Financial Soundness 
Indicators and World Bank Global Financial Development DataBank. 
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In Figure 3 we observe that, after the GFC, greater worldwide regulation of the banking 
sector led banks globally to increase the amount of capital allocated as a buffer for their risky 
assets. The new regulatory frameworks have considerably shrunk the credit availability of 
banks, hence resulting in lower bank risk taking. Also, in the case of our latter variable, the 
enhancement of banks solvency appears as especially pronounced post-OMT and Banking 
Union announcements, which is sign of an improvement in banks safety. However, overall we 
observe a similar picture to that presented in Figure 2, disclosing a significantly higher banking 
risk in GIIPS countries as opposed to non-GIIPS, represented by much riskier positions of 
banks (supported by thinner capital buffers). 
 
[Insert Figures 1, 2 and 3 about here] 
 
4.4. Main Controls 
Finally, we include in our baseline model several additional control variables. In particular, we 
include standard gravity model variables, controlling both for information frictions and 
transaction costs arising from the individual FDI bilateral transactions and for cultural links, 
arising from a shared historical background of origin and host countries. The inclusion of 
gravity model variables is a standard practice in the literature on bilateral cross-border 
investment, especially when studying FDI. Portes & Rey (2005) provide evidence that gravity 
variables proxying country size and transaction costs – arising from informational frictions 
differences in technology – might explain up to 83% of bilateral cross-country equity flows 
(Martin & Rey 2004, Portes & Rey 2005). Daude & Fratzscher (2008) confirm that FDI is 
much more dependent on informational frictions than portfolio flows. With respect to gravity 
variables, we follow Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008) amongst others and include several control 
variables, such as: (i) a dummy variable identifying whether the analysed countries share the 
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same official language; (ii) a control for the physical distance between the countries; (iii) a 
dummy variable disclosing whether the considered countries share a geographical border; (iv) 
a dummy variable identifying countries with a common religion; (v) a control variable for the 
time difference between the analysed countries; and (vi) a dummy variable determining country 
pairs with a common legal origin. 
In addition to the gravity variables, we also added supplementary control variables, 
identifying other potential drivers of FDI. Following Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), we 
controlled for the trade link between origin and EA countries, using the average bilateral import 
of the EA from the considered origin countries between 2009 and 2016. While, as suggested 
by Davis et al. (2000), we included correlation between host and origin countries GDP growth 
and between host countries’ stock market capitalisation and origin countries GDP growth. 
Specifically, the former variable accounts for diversification incentives (benefits) which could 
lead origin countries to FDI, while the latter to control for hedging incentives, arising from 
potential negative output shocks in the origin country. We also control for origin countries 
wealth and financial sector development, using respectively the second lag of origin countries 
GDP per capita and financial market capitalisation-over-GDP. This is motivated in the case of 
wealth by the idea that, as risk aversion is decreasing with wealth, we expect richer countries 
to be strongly driving FDI (Lane & Milesi-Ferretti, 2008). In the case of financial market 
development instead, this is based on the assumption that financial sophistication can facilitate 
foreign investment – see Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2001). Lastly, since push factors from the 
home country may include the need to escape domestic taxes or high exchange rate 
fluctuations, we added a control for host countries fiscal policies, using host countries’ 
government tax revenues-over-GDP, and for exchange rate movements, using the standard 
deviation of bilateral currencies (for more details on the computation of our control variables, 
see Appendix A.0.1). 
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5. Results 
In this section, we present and discuss the estimation results of equations (3.1) and (3.2). Table 
1 contains our main specification where we focus on the two core risk variables – Non-
Performing Loans and 10-Year Sovereign Bond Yields. Given the bilateral nature of our data, 
we estimate for each risk proxy, two equations (3.1) and (3.2), for the origin and host country 
risk, respectively. Doing this, we can assess which one is the most relevant for FDI, i.e. whether 
risk in the origin country or in the host country matter the most, or whether they matter in a 
similar fashion. In Table 2, we split our sample into GIIPS and non-GIIPS countries. The 
separate consideration of our full sample of countries is a standard step performed by literature 
analysing the geographical pattern of capital flows – see Milesi-Ferretti et al. (2010), Beck et 
al. (2016) – and is especially crucial for our study. This is justified by the considerable 
difference that we observe in the levels of sovereign and banking risk within the Monetary 
Union (see Figure 2).  
Considering Table 1 first of all, the included gravity variables are statistically 
significant and have the expected sign. In line with the previous literature (Beck et al., 2016; 
Daude & Fratzscher, 2008; Martin & Rey, 2004; Portes & Rey, 2005), both average import and 
standard gravity variables – proxying information and transaction costs – are important drivers 
of FDI. Sharing the same official language and high proximity, increase foreign direct 
investment. This is testified by comm_lang dummy with a coefficient of about 1.4 in both 
columns (1) and (2) and by the two variables of log(distance) and contig7. The latter variables 
have respectively coefficients of -0.95 in column (1) (and 0.6 in column (2)) – in the case of 
log(distance) – and 2.10 in column (1) (and 1.37 in column (2)) – for contig. All the coefficients 
are supporting our “story” and are significant at 1% level. Similarly, we found that cultural and 
 
7 We tested our result also using the time difference between host and origin countries, the results are unaffected, 
and the coefficients are similar to those of the log(distance) variable. The two variables have not been included 
together because of the high correlation between them.  
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institutional affinity also positively affect FDI in the EA. Specifically, having a shared religion 
or colonisation history positively influence FDI as well as sharing a legal origin. Apart from 
the common religion dummy, however, the other two variables are mostly found non-
significant. Similarly, also not significant appear to be the correlation in host and origin 
countries GDP growth and government tax revenues-over-GDP, ruling out the diversification 
incentive as potential driver for FDI, and the tax evasion motif. As expected, we found 
exchange rate volatility as extremely significant, both economically and statistically, as 1 
percent increase in volatility in the origin currencies-over-euro lead to an almost equivalent 
loss in foreign direct investment in EA countries (the coefficients are -1.17 in column(1) and -
0.92 in column (2)).  
 
5.1 Country risk impact on FDI 
Considering next the effect of greater non-performing loans in banks’ balance sheet on inward 
FDI – column (1), the origin country coefficient estimate in column (1) is statistically 
significant and has negative sign (-0.16), implying a reduction of FDI volume invested by 
MNEs. To the contrary, we observe that the coefficient estimate capturing the risk of host 
countries is not significant. These results do not confirm our hypothesis, highlighting that origin 
country risk hugely matters when dealing with FDI. As discussed in Section 1, increases in 
non-performing loans are likely to lead to less credit availability, particularly for firms wishing 
to invest overseas where imperfect knowledge considerations are greater. This matters much 
more in origin countries, where a closer institutional affinity and familiarity between banks and 
MNEs may well see more FDI financing take place than in host markets. In other words, our 
findings present an asymmetric effect across origin and host countries, resulting in FDI in the 
origin country being predominantly carried out via local banks, hence insensitive to host 
countries’ risk. 
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Continuing to focus on Table 1 and examining 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields, we can 
observe that both coefficients in column (2) of Table 1 are statistically significant and present 
a negative sign. This implies that higher sovereign risk, both domestically as well as in the host 
country, results in lower FDI in the Euro Area and confirms the first hypotheses. An increase 
in either origin or host country sovereign risk, is likely to decrease the FDI of MNEs giving a 
higher motive for companies to engage in less risk-taking and accumulate more cash holdings. 
Analogously, recent work has identified higher cash holdings and less investment generally 
due to financial crises (Song & Lee, 2012). Notably when comparing the magnitude of the 
coefficient estimates in column (2), we observe that the coefficient of the origin country is 
bigger than the coefficient of the host country. In particular, our regression model predicts an 
increase of 1% in 10 years government bonds’ yields in origin countries to result in a 1.4 
percent decrease in FDI, while an equivalent increase in host countries bond yields to result in 
a much less strong impact – a 0.46 percent decrease (more than three times smaller). Hence, it 
appears that origin countries risk is considerably more relevant than that of the host country, 
also providing evidence of the key role held by banks in financing global FDI – via the so-
called lending channel – discussed by the existent literature (Bridges et al., 2014; Bacchetta et 
al., 2014; Harford, 2005; Aiyar & Monaghan, 2015; Fraisse et al., 2017).  
In Table 2, we have a closer look at the EA countries and split the sample into GIIPS 
(i.e., stressed) and non-GIIPS (i.e., non-stressed) Euro Area countries. Given the sharper 
increase of sovereign risk for GIIPS countries over our sample period, the effect of such risk 
should be more pronounced in GIIPS countries than in non-GIIPS countries. Table 2 contains 
the relevant estimation results. Again, our main hypotheses, are confirmed. We confirm that 
banking risk and sovereign risk are both relevant. Banking risk is relevant for the origin country 
only, with respect to non-GIIPS countries (see column (1)), while sovereign risk is important 
for both origin and host country in all specifications (see column (2)). Surprisingly, the 
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coefficient estimates of our chosen risk variables become larger in absolute magnitude in the 
non-GIIPS country sub-sample. This might be attributed to foreign investors’ awareness of 
GIIPS greater levels of non-performing loans, hence to a previous embodiment of this piece of 
information. Undoubtedly, FDI in GIIPS countries, whose banking sector has been severely 
disrupted by the crises, seem to be also sensitive to an increase in banking sector stability. For 
example, an increase in banks’ capital buffers of 1 percent seem to increase FDI in GIIPS of 
0.16 percent. Sovereign yield shocks, among other variables, have instead a much stronger 
impact on FDI in GIIPS. This is coherent with a much stronger impact that the sovereign debt 
crisis had on the EA periphery, and with the numerous sovereign rating downgrades that took 
place in the years of analysis.  
This finding of an asymmetric behaviour of FDI in the EA, which came out 
contraposing direct investment in stressed as opposed to non-stressed EA countries, we believe 
has very important policy implications. This, as it increases the fragmentation within the 
European Monetary Union (EMU), both in terms of growth potential and in terms of 
availability of public finances, putting additional risk on GIIPS countries, hence enhancing 
political and financial market tensions in the European Union (Beck et al., 2016). Furthermore, 
this asymmetry between investor behaviour – mostly arising from origin countries – 
significantly limit ECB capital flow management policies, requiring a narrower and more 
specific scope.  
Several alternative specifications have been estimated, where we added various 
controls and fixed effects (e.g. we tested all variables in one regression, we excluded intra-EA 
FDI, and so on). Results are qualitatively unaffected by these alterations and are available on 
request.  
 
 [Insert Tables 1 and 2 around here] 
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6. Robustness 
In the paper, we present several robustness tests of our baseline model results.  
In Table 3 below we include an additional proxy for banking risk discussed previously 
in Section 4.4. Overall, our results and conclusions remain unaffected with further support 
provided for our hypotheses. In particular, also Regulatory Capital-over-Risk-Weighted Assets 
confirms that the origin country’s, as opposed to the host country’s, banking risk situation 
matters for FDI decisions.  
In Table 4, we test the possibility that a hedging incentive (see in columns (1) and (2)) 
or greater investors’ risk aversion are driving FDI positions of origin countries (in columns (3) 
and (4)) in the Euro Area. Therefore, following Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), Davis et al. 
(2000), in columns (1) and (2) we add to the baseline models the correlation between host 
countries financial market capitalisation and origin countries GDP per capita – proxy for a 
hedging incentives. In case of a hedging channel, we expect to observe the variable to have a 
negative coefficient, meaning that when domestic conditions in origin countries’ financial 
markets are impaired MNEs have the incentive to invest abroad. This would further support 
our theory on FDI being driven considerably more by origin country conditions, rather than 
host country ones. In columns (3) and (4), we test instead the relevance of origin countries’ 
economic wealth as driver for FDI. According to Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), since FDI 
involves risk, and risk aversion is a decreasing function of economic wealth, greater economic 
wealth should have a positive impact on origin countries FDI (i.e. richer countries would 
display greater levels of FDI).  
Overall, in Table 4, we find weak evidence of a hedging channel and strong support for 
the importance of origin countries’ wealth. Looking at columns (1) and (2) of Table 4, we find 
that a 1 percent increase in the synchronisation host-origin countries’ economic conditions 
implies a decrease in 0.44 percent in FDI. The result, however, is only significant at 10% level 
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in column (1), it is not significant instead in the second regression. In accordance with the 
findings of Lane & Milesi-Ferretti (2008), we confirm the importance of countries’ wealth, 
which we proxy using second lag of origin countries GDP per capita. Therefore, we find that 
1 percent increase in GDP per capita (t-2) results in a 0.6 increase in FDI in column (3) – and 
a 0.5 increase in column (4). Moreover, in both regressions model our core signs and economic 
significance remain unaffected.   
In Table 5 and 6, to further ensure that that our baseline regressions capture country 
specific risk – of origin and host countries – as opposed to global risk, we perform two 
additional tests. Firstly, we use two measures of global risk aversion (the VIX and the World 
Uncertainty Index8) capturing “push” (or common) risk factors, as opposed to “pull” (or 
country-specific) ones – already embedded in our baseline model. Secondly, to account for any 
cross-sectional variation arising at the host country level, we use host country and time fixed 
effects and we replace our core explanatory variables (banking and sovereign risk) with the 
corresponding differences between origin and host country risk. This is a standard practice of 
the gravity model literature (e.g. Beck et al. (2016); Carril-Caccia & Pavlova (2018)).  
Tables 5 and 6 again confirms the validity of our results, which remain qualitatively 
unaffected both after the inclusion of global risk variables and when we replace individual 
countries’ banking and sovereign risk with the difference between origin and host countries’ 
values of these variables9. Therefore, we still find that origin country characteristics outweigh 
those of the host when trying to explain inward FDI in the EMU. 
 
8 In order to determine the components of banking and sovereign risk which are not determined by global “push” 
factors, we used a two-stage approach. Specifically, in the first stage we separately regressed non-performing 
loans ratio and 10-years government bond yields on the VIX. The residuals from the first stage are then used in 
the second stage regression as additional explanatory variables for respectively the component of global risk, not 
captured by either banking or sovereign risk. 
9 In Table 6, instead of contraposing origin and host country risk factors, we include ‘Diff_bank_risk’ computed 
as the difference in ‘NPL ratio_orig’ and ‘NPL ratio_host’ as banking risk measure; and, ‘Diff_sov_risk’ 
computed as the difference in ‘Sovereign yields_orig’ and ‘Sovereign yields_host’ as sovereign risk measure. The 
results have been supplemented with both gravity and control variables previously explained, as well as time (t) 
and host country fixed effects (i). 
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Lastly, when estimating FDI movements within a monetary union, it might be relevant 
to distinguish Euro Area FDI inflow from non-Euro Area FDI inflow. Hence we estimate the 
regression from Table 2 with inward FDI from non-Euro Area countries only (see Table 12 – 
Appendix 2). Our results suggest that even when excluding intra-EA FDI allocation, origin 
country banking and sovereign risk conditions remain the main causes of lower FDI in the EA. 
 
 [Insert Tables 3, 4, 5 and 6 around here] 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper we investigate how elevated sovereign and banking risk affect Euro Area 
countries’ ability to attract foreign investment. In analysing this type of investment, the 
international finance and international business literature have examined several determinants 
of FDI, including those arising from political, social, geographical, technological, regulatory 
and/or firm specific spheres (Alam & Zulfiqar, 2013; Borin & Mancini, 2016; Dellis et al., 
2017; Narula, 2014). However, financial sector risk has often been considered less important 
and consequently, the risks to FDI, emanating both from recent financial crises (e.g., the GFC 
and sovereign debt crisis) and any policy responses to these, have been underexplored. To 
remedy this, we inspect inward FDI stock in the Euro Area between 2009 and 2016 in relation 
to various measures of financial stability, including non-performing loans and sovereign yields. 
Most importantly, we newly discriminate between effects emanating from the host and origin 
country.  
 Interestingly, when we analyse the impact of non-performing loans across both origin 
and host country banks, we find that host country banking risk is never significant in any our 
regression models or robustness tests. By contrast, origin country banking risk appears as an 
important determinant of the volume of FDI received by Euro Area countries. We attribute this 
finding to a ‘leverage channel’, whereby firms borrow from banks to finance investment, 
including FDI. Drawing on the banking literature, we suggest that banks’ lending in origin 
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countries will be considerably tighter when banks in their home countries display high levels 
of NPL, or, more generally speaking, in moments of greater uncertainty.  
 When we analyse sovereign risk of origin and host countries and inspect how this 
affects FDI, our findings are mixed. As a matter of fact, greater sovereign risk in either origin 
countries or hosts (EMU countries) leads to lower FDI positions in the Euro Area. However, 
in absolute magnitude, sovereign risk of the origin country matters more than that of the host 
country; an interesting finding given the typical weight placed on the importance of the host 
country characteristics in attracting FDI. We think that our findings are consistent with the 
literature on uncertainty and precautionary motives, whereby an increase in domestic country 
risk encourages its own MNEs to engage in less risk-taking. On the other hand, an increase in 
host country yield arguably implies that other destinations appear more attractive. 
When the Euro Area sample is separated into two subsamples representing non-stressed 
and stressed (i.e., Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain) countries, our findings remain 
qualitatively unaffected in our baseline regressions, as well as in all our robustness tests. 
Additionally, the reduction in FDI from origin countries with respect to sovereign risks, is 
clearly greater in the stressed case. The opposite is found with respect to banking risk, as an 
increase in such risks has a greater impact on non-GIIPS ability to attract FDI. However, origin 
country risk always appears to matter more than that of the host.  
Overall, our theoretical arguments and empirical results show that financial stability, 
both in origin and host countries, matters for FDI. This study provides further illustration of 
the dynamics of such processes, focusing on the effects of variations in bank-related risk, a key 
systemic feature where the range of regulatory choices is somewhat circumscribed. We would 
encourage policymakers in countries that seek to attract FDI not only to be mindful of the 
domestic conditions that lead to lower sovereign risk, but also to be cognisant of the changing 
financing environment that MNEs may face in their home countries, and, indeed, in deciding 
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which countries to target in seeking FDI. Additionally, we suggest the importance of addressing 
the asymmetric behaviour of FDI within the core and periphery of the Euro Area. Improving 
Euro Area convergence with respect to inward foreign investment, we believe could 
substantially reduce its fragmentation as well as curtail political and financial market tensions 
in the European Union. 
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Claeys, P. and Vašíček, B., 2014. Measuring bilateral spillover and testing contagion on 
sovereign bond markets in Europe. Journal of Banking & Finance, 46, pp.151-165. 
Damgaard, J. & Elkjaer, T. (2017), The global FDI network: searching for ultimate investors, 
International Monetary Fund.  
Damgaard, J., Elkjaer, T. and Johannesen, N. (2018). Piercing the veil. Finance and 
Development, 55(2), pp.51-53. 
 27 
Darvas, Z., Hüttl, P., Merler, S. and Walsh, T. (2015). Analysis of developments in EU capital 
flows in the global context. Bruegel Study, 3. 
Daude, C. & Fratzscher, M. (2008), ‘The pecking order of cross-border investment’, Journal 
of International Economics 74(1), 94–119.  
Davis, S. J., Nalewaik, J. & Willen, P. (2000), On the gains to international trade in risky 
financial assets, Technical report, National Bureau of Economic Research.  
De Bruyckere, V., Gerhardt, M., Schepens, G. & Vander Vennet, R. (2013), ‘Bank/sovereign 
risk spillovers in the European debt crisis’, Journal of Banking & Finance 37(12), 4793–4809.  
De Goede, M., 2004. Repoliticizing financial risk. Economy and Society, 33(2), pp.197-217. 
De Vries, T. & de Haan, J. (2016), ‘Credit ratings and bond spreads of the giips’, Applied 
Economics Letters 23(2), 107–111.  
Delatte, A.-L., Fouquau, J. & Portes, R. (2017), ‘Regime-dependent sovereign risk pricing 
during the euro crisis’, Review of Finance 21(1), 363–385.  
Dellis, K., Sondermann, D. & Vansteenkiste, I. (2017), ‘Determinants of FDI inflows in 
advanced economies: Does the quality of economic structures matter?’.  
Egger, P., Eggert, W. and Winner, H., 2010. Saving taxes through foreign plant 
ownership. Journal of International Economics, 81(1), pp.99-108. 
Flinders, M. and Buller, J., 2006. Depoliticisation: Principles, tactics and tools. British politics, 
1(3), pp.293-318. 
Forster, K., Vasardani, M.A. and Ca' Zorzi, M., 2011. Euro area cross-border financial flows 
and the global financial crisis. ECB Occasional Paper, (126). 
Fraisse, H., Lé, M., Thesmar, D. et al. (2017), ‘The real effects of bank capital requirements’. 
Galanos, G. and Poufinas, T., 2018. Impact of FDI in the Fiscal Adjustment Process. 
International Advances in Economic Research, 24(3), pp.265-277.  
 28 
Gao, J. & Grinstein, Y. (2014), ‘Firms’ cash holdings, precautionary motives, and systematic 
uncertainty’, Available at SSRN 2478349. 
Habib, M.M. and Venditti, F., 2018. The global financial cycle: implications for the global 
economy and the euro area. Economic Bulletin Articles, 6.  
Harford, J. (2005), ‘What drives merger waves?’, Journal of financial economics 77(3), 529–
560.  
Haufler, A., Mardan, M. and Schindler, D., 2018. Double tax discrimination to attract FDI and 
fight profit shifting: The role of CFC rules. Journal of International Economics, 114, pp.25-
43. 
Krugman, P., 2000. Fire-sale FDI. In Capital flows and the emerging economies: theory, 
evidence, and controversies (pp. 43-58). University of Chicago Press. 
Lane, P. R. & Milesi-Ferretti, G. M. (2001), ‘The external wealth of nations: measures of 
foreign assets and liabilities for industrial and developing countries’, Journal of International 
Economics 55(2), 263–294.  
Lane, P.R. and Milesi-Ferretti, G.M., 2008. International investment patterns. The Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 90(3), pp.538-549. 
Martin, P. & Rey, H. (2004), ‘Financial super-markets: size matters for asset trade’, Journal of 
international Economics 64(2), 335–361.  
Merler, S. and Pisani-Ferry, J., 2012. Who's afraid of sovereign bonds? (No. 2012/02). Bruegel 
Policy Contribution. 
Milesi-Ferretti, M. G.-M., Tamirisa, M. N. T. & Strobbe, M. F. (2010), Bilateral Financial 
Linkages and Global Imbalances: A Viewon the Eve of the Financial Crisis, number 10-257, 
International Monetary Fund.  
Milesi-Ferretti, G.M. and Tille, C., 2011. The great retrenchment: international capital flows 
during the global financial crisis. Economic policy, 26(66), pp.289-346. 
 29 
Narula, R. (2014), Globalization and technology: Interdependence, innovation systems and 
industrial policy, John Wiley & Sons.  
Neto, D.G. and Veiga, F.J., 2013. Financial globalization, convergence and growth: The role 
of foreign direct investment. Journal of International Money and Finance, 37, pp.161-186. 
Pegkas, P., 2015. The impact of FDI on economic growth in Eurozone countries. The Journal 
of Economic Asymmetries, 12(2), pp.124-132. 
Pesaran, M. H. (2004), ‘General diagnostic tests for cross section dependence in panels’.  
Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R. M. & Williamson, R. (2013), ‘Is there a us high cash holdings puzzle 
after the financial crisis?’.  
Portes, R. & Rey, H. (2005), ‘The determinants of cross-border equity flows’, Journal of 
International Economics 65(2), 269–296.  
Razin, A. and Sadka, E., 2007. Productivity and Taxes as Drivers of FDI (No. w13094). 
National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Rey, H. and Trilemma, D., 2013, August. The global financial cycle and monetary policy 
independence. In Economic Policy Symposium, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  
Shatz, H. & Venables, A. (2000), ‘The geography of international investment. vol. 2338’, 
Washington, DC: World Bank.  
Shin, H.S., 2012. Global banking glut and loan risk premium. IMF Economic Review, 60(2), 
pp.155-192. 
Shukla, P. & Cantwell, J. (2018), ‘Migrants and multinational firms: The role of institutional 
affinity and connectedness in FDI’, Journal of World Business 53(6), 835–849.  
Sondermann, D. and Vansteenkiste, I., 2019. Did the euro change the nature of FDI flows 
among member states?. ECB Working Paper 
Song, K. R. & Lee, Y. (2012), ‘Long-term effects of a financial crisis: Evidence from cash 
holdings of East Asian firms’, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 47(3), 617–641.  
 30 
Weitzel, U., Kling, G. and Gerritsen, D., 2014. Testing the fire-sale FDI hypothesis for the 
European financial crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance, 49, pp.211-234. 








Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU by OLS.  
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk   Sovereign Risk  
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.163*** (0.034)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.055 (0.042)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.402*** (0.137) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.456*** (0.134) 
avg (log(import)) 0.381*** (0.063)  0.470*** (0.085) 
comm_lang 1.331** (0.452)  1.420** (0.489) 
log(distance) -0.954*** (0.090)  -0.591*** (0.103) 
contig 2.099*** (0.425)  1.366*** (0.413) 
comrelig 1.014*** (0.271)  0.723* (0.380) 
colony 0.491 (0.635)  0.956 (0.695) 
com_leg_orig -0.188 (0.188)  0.690* (0.348) 
corr (GDP) 0.155 (0.203)  0.019 (0.254) 
log (vol FX) -1.173*** (0.070)  -0.920*** (0.077) 
log(taxes) 0.137 (0.341)  0.205 (0.447) 
Constant 12.381*** (1.457)  11.180*** (1.759) 
N 9,636  6,098 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.385  0.478 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. See the ‘Data’ section for variable description.
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Table 2 















 non-GIIPS  GIIPS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.175*** (0.047)    -0.160** (0.047)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.058 (0.057)    0.201 (0.601)   
log (Sovereign 
yields_orig) 
  -1.379*** (0.190)    -1.433*** (0.203) 
log (Sovereign 
yields_host) 
  -0.413** (0.169)    -0.957** (0.257) 
avg (log(import)) 0.395*** (0.076)  0.494*** (0.115)  0.388** (0.134)  0.414** (0.115) 
comm_lang 0.927 (0.697)  0.831 (0.748)  1.542** (0.463)  1.239 (0.971) 
log(distance) -0.923*** (0.109)  -0.513*** (0.112)  -1.120*** (0.223)  -0.876*** (0.188) 
contig 2.696*** (0.392)  2.094*** (0.440)  0.787 (1.091)  0.187 (0.951) 
comrelig 0.581 (0.490)  -0.091 (0.557)  1.372*** (0.294)  1.060** (0.359) 
colony 0.290 (0.893)  0.461 (0.978)  0.596 (0.450)  1.819* (0.712) 
com_leg_orig -0.308 (0.313)  0.446 (0.494)  -0.039 (0.132)  1.132*** (0.159) 
corr (GDP) 0.135 (0.202)  0.263 (0.253)  0.177 (0.342)  -0.265 (0.233) 
log (vol FX) -1.130*** (0.102)  -0.898*** (0.122)  -1.294*** (0.080)  -1.016*** (0.058) 
log(taxes) 0.384 (0.466)  0.364 (0.623)  -0.490 (0.878)  0.585 (0.281) 
Constant 11.459*** (1.716)  10.023*** (2.280)  15.322*** (3.680)  13.255*** (1.709) 
N 6,944  3,993  3,220  2,105 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.398  0.476  0.372  0.510 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 




Table 3  
Robustness check on the impact of banking risk (proxied by RC/RWA) on inward FDI in Euro Area by 
OLS.  
Additional banking Risk measure 
 log (FDI) 
log (RC/RWA_orig) -1.827*** (0.283) 
log (RC/RWA_host) 0.649 (0.387) 
avg (log(import)) 0.403*** (0.062) 
comm_lang 1.336*** (0.450) 
log(distance) -0.975*** (0.086) 
contig 1.987*** (0.404) 
comrelig 0.942*** (0.293) 
colony 0.495 (0.616) 
com_leg_orig -0.209 (0.190) 
corr (GDP) 0.039 (0.191) 
log (vol FX) -1.150*** (0.068) 
log(taxes) 0.175 (0.404) 
Constant 15.001*** (1.833) 
N 9,636 
Time FE Yes 
R-squared 0.395 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. See the ‘Data’ section for variable description. 
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Table 4 














 Test for Hedging incentives  Test for Origin country Risk Aversion 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.172*** (0.037)    -0.121*** (0.029)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.137 (0.083)    0.044 (0.045)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.430*** (0.152)    -1.099*** (0.124) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.533*** (0.162)    -0.477*** (0.133) 
avg(log(import)) 0.458*** (0.067)  0.501*** (0.098)  0.385*** (0.063)  0.480*** (0.085) 
comm_lang 1.350** (0.492)  1.347** (0.548)  1.340*** (0.447)  1.411*** (0.459) 
log (distance) -0.928*** (0.097)  -0.588*** (0.121)  -0.845*** (0.085)  -0.536*** (0.104) 
contig 2.053*** (0.469)  1.148** (0.450)  1.989*** (0.383)  1.359*** (0.392) 
comrelig 0.932*** (0.273)  0.731* (0.384)  1.040*** (0.266)  0.672* (0.381) 
colony 0.191 (0.668)  0.750 (0.749)  0.547 (0.569)  0.965 (0.641) 
com_leg_orig -0.133 (0.192)  0.827** (0.356)  -0.099 (0.170)  0.727** (0.327) 
corr (GDP) 0.079 (0.241)  -0.077 (0.277)  0.087 (0.185)  -0.043 (0.240) 
log (vol FX) -1.219*** (0.070)  -0.952*** (0.085)  -0.799*** (0.044)  -0.768*** (0.072) 
log(taxes) 0.146 (0.338)  0.224 (0.450)  0.100 (0.341)  0.208 (0.453) 
corr (GDP, MKTCAP) -0.444* (0.218)  -0.332 (0.204)     
L2 (GDP per capita orig)     0.634*** (0.070)  0.504*** (0.054) 
Constant 11.627*** (1.795)  11.162*** (1.976)  4.315** (1.733)  4.959** (2.015) 
N 8,026  5,308  9,617  6,080 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.375  0.477  0.426  0.497 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 
within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects are included but unreported. In columns (1) and (2) we proxy hedging incentives using the correlation between 
host country stock market capitalisation and origin country GDP growth. In columns (3) and (4), defined origin country wealth using the second lag of GDP 
per capita of origin countries and assuming that wealth is positively associated to risk-taking. 
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Table 5 
Results on the impact of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ risk factors on inward FDI in the EMU by two-stage OLS regression.  
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk  Sovereign Risk Banking Risk Sovereign Risk  
 VIX WUI 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 log (FDI) log (FDI) log (FDI) log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.162*** (0.043)   -0.116*** (0.036)  
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.057 (0.044)  0.056 (0.039)  
log (Sovereign yields_orig)  -1.334*** (0.107)  -0.701*** (0.102) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)  -0.300*** (0.112)  -0.148* (0.086) 
res_VIX 0.065 (0.149) 3.035*** (0.435)   
res_WUI   0.144 (0.112) -1.395*** (0.332) 
avg (log(import)) 0.381*** (0.040) 0.470*** (0.047) 0.428*** (0.020) 0.484*** (0.032) 
comm_lang 1.331*** (0.411) 1.420*** (0.435) 1.453*** (0.369) 1.796*** (0.378) 
log (distance) -0.954*** (0.099) -0.591*** (0.114) -0.445*** (0.091) -0.305*** (0.109) 
contig 2.099*** (0.411) 1.366*** (0.415) 1.504*** (0.374) 0.732* (0.385) 
comrelig 1.014*** (0.293) 0.723** (0.361) 0.881*** (0.256) 0.598* (0.333) 
colony 0.491 (0.524) 0.956* (0.576) -0.118 (0.474) 0.186 (0.521) 
com_leg_orig -0.188 (0.180) 0.690*** (0.231) -0.404** (0.159) 0.289 (0.224) 
corr (GDP) 0.155 (0.139) 0.019 (0.178) 0.254** (0.125) 0.143 (0.167) 
log (vol FX) -1.173*** (0.078) -0.920*** (0.097) -0.804*** (0.067) -0.691*** (0.091) 
log (taxes) 0.137 (0.370) 0.205 (0.425) 0.275 (0.318) 0.197 (0.393) 
Constant 12.326*** (1.514) 8.833*** (1.640) 6.240*** (1.353) 5.503*** (1.589) 
N 9,636 6,098 9,406 5,911 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.440      0.494 0.496 0.535 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 
within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects are included but unreported. In columns (1) and (2) we report the results of a two-stage OLS regression having 
the VIX as of ‘push’ risk factor. In columns (3) and (4) we report the results of a two-stage OLS regression using the World Uncertainty Index (WUI) as of 





Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU by OLS.  
 Banking Risk  Sovereign Risk Both 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 log (FDI) log (FDI) log (FDI) 
log (Diff_bank_risk) -0.148*** (0.036)  -0.088** (0.044) 
log (Diff_sov_risk)  -1.145*** (0.097) -1.116*** (0.097) 
avg (log(import)) 0.697*** (0.236) -0.203 (0.309) -0.266 (0.308) 
comm_lang 1.255*** (0.428) 1.238*** (0.461) 1.209*** (0.463) 
log (distance) -0.947*** (0.098) -0.579*** (0.113) -0.622*** (0.114) 
contig 2.182*** (0.408) 1.558*** (0.418) 1.534*** (0.418) 
comrelig 0.980*** (0.307) 0.597* (0.357) 0.600* (0.358) 
colony 0.584 (0.520) 1.042* (0.591) 1.030* (0.597) 
com_leg_orig -0.205 (0.190) 0.629*** (0.231) 0.655*** (0.232) 
corr (GDP) 0.081 (0.157) 0.062 (0.182) 0.056 (0.182) 
log (vol FX) -1.180*** (0.078) -1.025*** (0.094) -1.024*** (0.094) 
log (taxes) 1.028** (0.497) -0.773 (0.757) -0.925 (0.754) 
Constant 7.772*** (2.475) 14.964*** (3.530) 16.124*** (3.524) 
N 9,636 6,098 6,098 
Time FE Yes Yes Yes 
Host FE  Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.399 0.484 0.486 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 





Figure 1  
 
 
Notes. In this Figure, we display FDI inflows in the Euro Area (dotted line), as well as in GIIPS (solid 
line) and Non-GIIPS (dashed line) countries. FDI inflow data ranges from 2002 to 2016 and its reported 
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Figure 2  
  
 
Notes. On the left-hand side, we present the average 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields. In our paper, we use this indicator to measure EA sovereign risk. On the 
right-hand side, we show instead Non-Performing Loans/Total Gross Loans. In our paper, we use this indicator to measure the risk of the EA banking sector. 
Both measures have been averaged across three main groups of countries: major non-EA countries {USA, UK, CAN, JPN} (MJ-NEA), Euro Area Periphery 
(GIIPS) and non-Periphery EA countries (non-GIIPS-EA). For a detailed list of the countries included in each of the aforementioned categories, see Table 7. 
Source. IMF International Financial Statistics (IMF IFS), OECD Financial Statistics, CEIC, Oesterreichische Nationalbank, Bloomberg, World Bank Global 

























































Notes. Averages of Regulatory Capital/Risk-Weighted Assets of major non-EA countries {USA, UK, CAN, JPN} (MJ-NEA), Euro Area Periphery (GIIPS) 
and non-Periphery EA countries (non-GIIPS-EA). In our paper, we use this indicator to measure the risk of the EA banking sector. For a detailed list of the 












































A.0 A: Dataset Description  
A.0.1 Data  
Inward FDI: Annual data on foreign countries’ FDI holdings in EA countries is collected from 
the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Survey (CDIS). From this dataset, we collected 
’inward’ FDI positions in EA countries, cross-classified by economy of the immediate investor 
(see IMF’s Coordinated Direct Investment Survey Guide – 2015).  
 
Gravity Variables: Gravity variables of ’Geographical Distance’, ’Common Official 
Language’, ’Contiguity’, ’Common Religion’, ’Colony’, ’Time difference’ and ’Common 
Legal Origin’ are instead collected from the ’Comptes Harmonisés sur les Echanges et 
L’Economie Mondiale (CHELEM)’ database, developed by the CEPII Research Center. The 
’Gravity Dataset’ is a dyadic dataset, disclosing many features for the reported country pairs, 
such as: geographical distance (in kilometres) between the capitals of most of the countries in 
the world, whether or not the countries share the same official language, whether the countries 
share a geographical border, whether the countries share the same official religion or 
colonization history, the time difference between the countries, their legal origin and more (see 
Meyer and Zignago, 2011).  
 
Country Risk Variables: Country Risk variables have been gathered the World Bank Global 
Financial Development Database and from IMF Financial Soundness Indicators Database (with 
the exception of the 10-year Sovereign Bond Yields, for which we used IMF IFS, supplemented 
for a few missing observations with OECD Financial Statistics, Oesterreichische 
NationalBank, CEIC and Bloomberg). The World Bank Global Financial Development 
Database is an extensive dataset gathering information on the functioning of the financial 
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system. Among the information presented in this database, it reports statistics on: financial 
depth, financial services access, efficiency and stability (resilience) of the financial system and 
of the institutions operating in it. Almost all our ’Country Risk’ variables have been collected 
from the Financial Stability Section of this database. Additionally, the IMF Financial 
Soundness Indicators Database is also a comprehensive dataset providing statistics on financial 
system resilience. In particular, it contains granular information on: financial intermediaries’ 
stability, as well as detailed statistics on other entities such as financial and non-financial 
corporations. From the latter database, we collected data on banks’ regulatory capital to risk-
weighted assets, that we then further supplemented using the World Bank Global Financial 
Development Database.  
 
GDP per capita and GDP Growth: Annual data on GDP per capital has been obtained from 
World Bank Statistics. This database combines macro-economic data from the World Bank 
National Account database and from the OECD National Accounts data files.  
Average host country imports: Annual bilateral import of Euro Area countries (host) from 
origin countries have been collected from the International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade 
Statistics. This data has been then used to compute the average between 2009 and 2016.  
 
Foreign Exchange rate and Foreign Exchange volatility: Bilateral exchange rate of all 
origin countries national currencies against the euro, have been collected from S&P Global 
Database. In the case of Euro Area countries, we reported the value of the Euro defined in terms 
of the SDR. The SDR is an international reserve asset, created by the IMF in 1969 to 
supplement its member countries’ official reserves, whose value is determined in terms of a 
basket of five major currencies (U.S. dollar, the euro, the Chinese renminbi, the Japanese yen, 
 42 
and the British pound sterling). Data for the SDR have been collected from the IMF Exchange 
rate data.  
 
Taxes: Annual data on domestic government tax revenues as a percentage of GDP are collected 
from World Bank Global Financial Development Database.  
 
A.0.2 – Countries 
In our analysis we included a broad range of countries (i.e., 112 countries). The countries that 
we considered are all those voluntarily participating in the IMF Coordinated Direct Investment 
Survey (CDIS), with the exception of tax heavens, small countries with large financial centres 
or war zones. Specifically, below we report the detailed composition of our dataset: 
 
Countries included in the dataset: Within the Euro Area (EA), we considered all countries 
with the exception of Lithuania, as it joined the EA in 2015, Malta and Luxembourg. With 
respect to non-Euro Area countries, we consider: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, 
Armenia, Australia, Bangladesh, Belarus, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Cambodia, Canada, Central African 
Republic, Chile, China, P.R. Mainland, Colombia, Congo, Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Egypt, El Salvador, Gabon, Georgia, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Guinea, Guinea- Bissau, Guyana, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Islamic Republic 
of, Israel, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Republic of Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Liberia, Lithuania, Macedonia, FYR, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Qatar, Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Sri 
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Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Tanzania, Thailand, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Republica Bolivariana 
de, Vietnam, Yemen, Republic of Zambia, Zimbabwe. 
 
A.0.3 – Descriptive Statistics 
Table 7  
Summary statistics on foreign direct investment and key independent variables. 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 115 405.877 1,085.274 -1,633.905 5,358.714 
Ireland IRL 120 10,968.990 36,481.940 -23,034.350 154,667.400 
Italy ITA 120 17,134.910 27,606.310 7.640 124,198.700 
Portugal PRT 120 1,563.345 4,669.577 -8,047.017 24,486.880 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 5,389.935 8,987.756 -841.423 35,873.030 
Belgium BEL 120 20,817.410 46,705.070 -3,770.425 225,544.700 
Cyprus CYP 119 2,095.746 5,230.197 -5,192.275 27,625.580 
Estonia EST 120 85.241 281.451 -76.971 1,962.515 
Finland FIN 120 3,085.604 6,469.908 -1,011.345 31,934.490 
France FRA 120 34,176.300 50,160.460 45.023 178,235.400 
Germany DEU 120 27,228.140 47,179.820 87.096 242,784.100 
Latvia LVA 119 41.694 112.753 -40.353 649.823 
Netherlands NLD 120 55,631.900 64,693.200 0.000 248,562.200 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 79.657 383.796 -602.303 2,907.801 
Slovenia SVN 114 13.949 116.841 -246.902 1,140.897 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 120 10.959 5.244 5.174 22.498 
Ireland IRL 120 4.352 2.771 0.736 9.602 
Italy ITA 120 3.710 1.444 1.488 5.493 
Portugal PRT 120 5.755 2.921 2.423 10.548 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 2.184 1.195 0.377 3.937 
Belgium BEL 120 2.505 1.311 0.476 4.233 
Cyprus CYP 120 5.350 1.061 3.773 7.000 
Estonia EST 30 6.873 0.920 5.968 7.778 
Finland FIN 120 2.005 1.106 0.363 3.739 
France FRA 120 2.226 1.090 0.467 3.649 
Germany DEU 120 1.673 1.042 0.090 3.223 
Latvia LVA 120 5.064 4.029 0.534 12.358 
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Netherlands NLD 120 2.000 1.108 0.292 3.687 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 3.029 1.567 0.543 4.707 
Slovenia SVN 120 3.865 1.644 1.149 5.812 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 120 24.055 11.623 7.000 36.647 
Ireland IRL 120 17.357 5.453 9.800 25.709 
Italy ITA 120 14.334 3.371 9.400 18.064 
Portugal PRT 120 9.325 2.821 4.800 11.962 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 2.885 0.359 2.300 3.473 
Belgium BEL 120 3.578 0.476 2.799 4.245 
Cyprus CYP 120 27.329 18.361 4.500 48.676 
Estonia EST 120 2.745 1.766 0.870 5.375 
Finland FIN 60 0.550 0.050 0.500 0.600 
France FRA 120 4.112 0.227 3.759 4.495 
Germany DEU 105 2.773 0.442 1.980 3.300 
Latvia LVA 120 9.039 4.703 3.652 15.934 
Netherlands NLD 120 2.912 0.239 2.531 3.227 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 5.222 0.403 4.444 5.836 
Slovenia SVN 120 10.136 3.351 5.071 15.180 




N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Greece GRC 120 13.108 2.527 9.569 16.947 
Ireland IRL 120 19.988 4.480 12.780 26.941 
Italy ITA 120 13.295 1.018 11.650 14.789 
Portugal PRT 120 11.807 1.308 9.780 13.327 





N Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Austria AUT 120 16.500 1.027 15.026 17.976 
Belgium BEL 120 18.389 0.637 17.262 19.305 
Cyprus CYP 120 13.351 2.908 7.343 16.943 
Estonia EST 120 24.721 5.969 18.607 35.653 
Finland FIN 120 17.455 3.463 14.188 23.337 
France FRA 120 14.804 2.054 12.324 17.752 
Germany DEU 120 17.423 1.413 14.820 19.160 
Latvia LVA 120 17.578 2.736 13.724 21.823 
Netherlands NLD 120 16.481 3.091 13.478 22.375 
Slovak 
Republic 
SVK 120 15.501 2.142 12.571 17.982 
Slovenia SVN 120 14.458 3.294 11.320 19.155 
Notes: Panel A discloses descriptive statistics on inward FDI stock received by EA countries between 
2009 and 2016. Panel B contains descriptive statistics on 10-year sovereign bond yields of EA countries. 
In Panel C we report descriptive statistics EA banks NPL ratio. Panel D shows descriptive statistics on 
Regulatory Capital held by EA banks as a portion of their Risk-Weighted assets. For all the Panels, we 
report statistics on GIIPS and non-GIIPS EA countries separately. 
 45 
A.1 Additional analyses  
A.1.2 Correlation matrix 
 


















































































































































































































































































































































































Table 8 Continued. Transposed 
 log(taxes) log(10SBY)orig log(10SBY)host log(RCRWA)orig log(RCRWA)host log(NPL)orig 
log(import)) -0.239 0.006 -0.273 0.014 -0.051 -0.008 
comm_lang 0.027 -0.02 -0.009 0.003 0.101 -0.013 
log(distance) 0.012 0.322 0.043 -0.045 -0.043 -0.22 
contig -0.05 -0.137 -0.053 -0.019 0.029 0.075 
comrelig -0.054 -0.078 -0.091 -0.006 0.0181 0.046 
colony -0.045 0.008 -0.012 -0.021 -0.022 0.004 
com_leg_orig 0.058 0.062 0.082 -0.051 -0.043 0.076 
corr (GDP) -0.086 -0.168 -0.191 -0.011 0.156 0.052 
log (FX) 0.008 0.263 -0.036 0.221 0.027 0.009 
log (vol FX) 0.007 0.501 -0.013 0.123 0.013 -0.026 
log(taxes) 1 -0.035 0.13 0.027 0.0627 -0.018 
log (10SBY)_orig  1 0.195 -0.007 -0.151 0.148 
log (10SBY)_host   1 -0.164 -0.596 0.101 
log (RCRWA)_orig    1 0.111 -0.095 
log (RCRWA)_host     1 -0.074 
log (NPL) orig      1 
Notes: All the coefficients reported in bold are significant at 5% level.  
 
 
A.1.3 Additional tests  
As additional tests, we performed: (i) Wooldridge test for serial correlation, (ii) Pesaran test for cross-sectional dependence and (iii) Fisher test on 
variable stationarity. As a result of evidence of serial correlation and cross-sectional dependence, we corrected our standard error structure using 
time fixed-effects and clustering of our standard errors at the host country level.  
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A.2 Additional test results  
In this section, we present the results of other tests that we perform to robustify the validity of 
our theory.  
Table 9  
Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, accounting 
for origin countries’ economic growth. Regression results obtained by OLS. 
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk measure  Sovereign Risk measure 
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.178*** (0.038)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.065 (0.047)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.449*** (0.157) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.443*** (0.149) 
avg (log(import)) 0.353*** (0.060)  0.431*** (0.083) 
comm_lang 1.180** (0.425)  1.133** (0.466) 
log (distance) -0.992*** (0.102)  -0.562*** (0.104) 
contig 2.411*** (0.341)  1.669*** (0.368) 
comrelig 0.938*** (0.308)  0.704 (0.427) 
colony 0.357 (0.683)  0.595 (0.765) 
com_leg_orig -0.251 (0.231)  0.623 (0.395) 
corr (GDP) -0.045 (0.218)  -0.079 (0.300) 
log (vol FX) -1.178*** (0.081)  -0.936*** (0.087) 
log (taxes) 0.176 (0.313)  0.186 (0.426) 
L1 (GDP Growth_orig) 0.042 (0.043)  0.064 (0.045) 
Constant 12.845*** (1.462)  11.309*** (1.759) 
N 6,545  4,071 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.395  0.478 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. As proxy for economic growth, in this Table we adopt the first lag of GDP 
growth of origin countries; other variables are described in the ‘Data’ section. 
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Table 10 
Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, accounting 
for origin countries’ financial sophistication10. Regression results obtained by OLS. 
Country Risk 
 Banking Risk measure  
Sovereign Risk 
measure 
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.224*** (0.036)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.040 (0.043)   
log (Sovereign 
yields_orig) 
  -1.168*** (0.151) 
log (Sovereign 
yields_host) 
  -0.483** (0.174) 
avg(log(import)) 0.384*** (0.062)  0.561*** (0.097) 
comm_lang 1.418*** (0.438)  1.192* (0.617) 
log(distance) -1.118*** (0.087)  -1.085*** (0.106) 
contig 1.507*** (0.390)  0.412 (0.447) 
comrelig 1.003*** (0.284)  0.597 (0.450) 
colony 0.494 (0.619)  0.740 (0.617) 
com_leg_orig -0.131 (0.171)  0.504* (0.271) 
corr (GDP) 0.117 (0.176)  0.044 (0.292) 
log (vol FX) -1.008*** (0.051)  -0.879*** (0.089) 
log(taxes) 0.120 (0.341)  0.088 (0.510) 
log (MKTCAP/GDP orig) 0.346*** (0.042)  0.927*** (0.125) 
Constant 12.659*** (1.411)  11.436*** (1.850) 
N 9,636  6,098 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.440  0.494 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. As proxy for financial market sophistication, in this Table we adopt the 
logarithm of the ratio of origin countries’ equity market capitalisation-over-GDP; other variables are 
described in the ‘Data’ section.  
 
10 Note that, according to Davis et al. (2000) argument, origin countries financial sophistication should favour 
their FDI, once foreign countries’ conditions prove as preferable to those of their home country. On the contrary, 
countries with less developed financial markets could face higher costs (barriers to entry) in investing abroad. 
This would bias them towards investing in their home market. 
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Table 11 
Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, controlling 
for origin countries’ Business Cycle (BC). Regression results obtained by OLS. 
                                              Country Risk 
 Banking Risk   Sovereign Risk  
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.113*** (0.037)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.061 (0.040)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -0.765*** (0.107) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.360*** (0.125) 
BC 0.103 (0.077)  -0.012 (0.134) 
avg (log(import)) 0.428*** (0.020)  0.484*** (0.032) 
comm_lang 1.453*** (0.369)  1.796*** (0.378) 
log (distance) -0.446*** (0.091)  -0.305*** (0.109) 
contig 1.503*** (0.374)  0.732* (0.385) 
comrelig 0.881*** (0.256)  0.598* (0.333) 
colony -0.118 (0.474)  0.186 (0.521) 
com_leg_orig -0.405** (0.159)  0.290 (0.224) 
corr (GDP) 0.254** (0.125)  0.143 (0.167) 
log (vol FX) -0.804*** (0.067)  -0.691*** (0.091) 
log (taxes) 0.275 (0.318)  0.196 (0.393) 
Constant 6.166*** (1.350)  6.377*** (1.579) 
N 9,406  5,911 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.496  0.535 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. Origin countries’ BC has been computed as the cyclical component of 
these countries’ GDP, obtained using a Hodrick-Prescott filtering process with smoothing factor of 100; 



















 non-GIIPS  GIIPS 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.201*** (0.063)    -0.207*** (0.078)   
log (NPL ratio_host) 0.086 (0.054)    0.085 (0.294)   
log (Sovereign 
yields_orig) 
  -1.471*** (0.172)    -1.302*** (0.206) 
log (Sovereign 
yields_host) 
  -0.428* (0.221)    -1.061*** (0.297) 
avg (log(import)) 0.400*** (0.051)  0.521*** (0.068)  0.460*** (0.100)  0.465*** (0.117) 
comm_lang -0.244 (0.808)  0.223 (1.355)  1.968*** (0.687)  2.083** (0.821) 
log(distance) -0.806*** (0.134)  -0.442*** (0.156)  -0.593*** (0.207)  -0.514** (0.208) 
contig 2.816*** (0.564)  2.260*** (0.627)  -0.522 (1.329)  -1.733 (1.074) 
comrelig 0.036 (0.444)  -0.688 (0.580)  -0.006 (0.453)  0.044 (0.646) 
colony 1.180 (0.736)  0.817 (0.888)  1.605 (1.071)  3.167** (1.246) 
com_leg_orig -0.186 (0.258)  0.598* (0.337)  -0.700*** (0.249)  -0.131 (0.406) 
corr (GDP) 0.096 (0.188)  0.411 (0.273)  0.179 (0.243)  -0.094 (0.302) 
log (vol FX) -0.997*** (0.105)  -0.806*** (0.143)  -1.116*** (0.156)  -1.013*** (0.176) 
log(taxes) 0.448 (0.504)  0.537 (0.599)  0.033 (0.821)  1.014 (0.889) 
Constant 9.810*** (2.088)  8.634*** (2.320)  9.138*** (3.220)  8.823*** (3.284) 
N 5,215  2,930  2,660  1,575 
Time FE Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.293  0.427  0.295  0.478 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered 




Estimation results on the impact of banking and sovereign risk on inward FDI in the EMU, controlling 
for the size and capital intensity of origin and host countries. Regression results obtained by OLS. 
                                              Country Risk 
 Banking Risk   Sovereign Risk  
 (1)  (2) 
 log (FDI)  log (FDI) 
log (NPL ratio_orig) -0.080** (0.040)   
log (NPL ratio_host) -0.014 (0.042)   
log (Sovereign yields_orig)   -1.107*** (0.118) 
log (Sovereign yields_host)   -0.684*** (0.124) 
ln_sumGDPg -0.038 (0.040)  -0.147*** (0.049) 
L1_log (diffGDPpc) 0.112*** (0.009)  0.077*** (0.010) 
avg (log(import)) 0.461*** (0.038)  0.507*** (0.046) 
comm_lang 1.438*** (0.407)  1.560*** (0.442) 
log (distance) -0.882*** (0.094)  -0.579*** (0.112) 
contig 2.052*** (0.387)  1.353*** (0.401) 
comrelig 1.224*** (0.275)  0.847** (0.353) 
colony 0.451 (0.475)  0.914* (0.534) 
com_leg_orig -0.109 (0.173)  0.749*** (0.226) 
corr (GDP) 0.128 (0.132)  -0.052 (0.175) 
log (vol FX) -0.808*** (0.082)  -0.740*** (0.101) 
log (taxes) 0.384 (0.344)  0.467 (0.410) 
Constant 9.788*** (1.430)  9.410*** (1.573) 
N 9,626  6,088 
Time FE Yes  Yes 
R-squared 0.432  0.499 
Notes: *, **, and *** imply statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. In the 
parentheses are reported robust standard errors clustered within country pairs. Yearly time fixed effects 
are included but unreported. In this Table, we use the natural logarithm of the sum of GDP growth of 
origin and host country as proxy for size of the economies involved in the bilateral transaction. We 
exploit the first lag of the natural logarithm of the difference in origin and host countries GDP per capita 
to control instead for the economies’ capital intensity.  
 
 
